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Buttrey v. United States: The Meaning of
"Public Hearings" Under Section 404
I. Introduction
In deciding the case of Buttrey v. United States,' the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to interpret
section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).2 The court held
that section 404 did not require the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to use the full trial-type, ad-
versarial procedures of sections 554, 556 and 557 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA)3 when holding a public
hearing to determine whether to issue a permit for a dredge
and fill operation. The Fifth Circuit interpreted section 404 to
require only the informal notice and comment procedures of
section 553 of APA.4 The court's holding is significant because
it distinguishes the meaning of "public hearing" under section
404 from identical language, used in section 402 of the same
act,5 which had previously been held to require full trial-type
proceedings.'
This note analyzes the court's holding in Buttrey and
compares the rationale behind the decision with that of other
courts which have reached different conclusions when constru-
1. 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
2. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, title IV, amended by Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub.
L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 884, amended by Act of Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, § 67(a),
(b), 91 Stat. 1600, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (CWA § 404) provides that the Secretary of the Army "may
issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (CWA § 402) provides that the Administrator of EPA "may,
after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,
or combination of pollutants. ... 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982).
6. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
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ing similar language in section 402 of the statute. The note
contrasts the opinions and shows both the consistencies and
the inconsistencies in the rationales. It suggests that the But-
trey holding is irreconcilably inconsistent with the previous
holdings in other circuits. Finally, the note examines the ac-
tual impact Buttrey has made on subsequent lower court deci-
sions and submits that the Buttrey holding may have been
incorrectly decided.
II. Facts of the Case
John Buttrey and Buttrey Developments Inc. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Buttrey") are involved in the busi-
ness of developing land for residential use. Buttrey's opera-
tions include both the development of the land and the con-
struction and sale of the residential housing upon the
developed land.
In 1978, Buttrey began operations to develop an area near
Slidell, Louisiana known as the Gum Bayou. Because proper
development of the area required the channelization of a
small, slow running stream to improve drainage, Buttrey ap-
plied to the district office of the Corps for a dredge and fill
permit to dredge the stream bottom and fill its low lying
banks. Upon receipt of Buttrey's application, the Corps issued
a public notice of Buttrey's proposed alteration of the stream.
Publication of the notice resulted in numerous and vehement
objections to the proposed alteration from both public agen-
cies and private interest groups. The basis of the objections
made by these groups to the proposed development was that
the Buttrey project would destroy natural drainage and sew-
age capacity, destroy a natural habitat for wildlife, damage an
aesthetically pleasing wetlands area, and increase the risk of
flooding in neighboring areas.
Buttrey responded to the objections by filing memoran-
dums of law, reports and studies by environmentalists and en-
gineers, and letters from adjoining homeowners, all of which
favorably supported the development of the Gum Bayou area.
In addition, Buttrey requested that the Corps grant him an
adversarial hearing in the event that the objections raised to
1985]
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his plan for development would require a denial of the issu-
ance of the dredge and fill permit.
The Corps reviewed the evidence and personally dis-
cussed the matter- with Buttrey. On April .2, 1980, the Corps
issued an environmental assessment which disapproved But-
trey's proposed development and denied Buttrey the permit.
Buttrey later brought suit in the District Court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana 7 challenging the Corps' decision and
seeking damages and injunctive relief against the Corps. The
district court, holding in favor of the Corps, denied Buttrey
any relief. Buttrey then appealed the district court decision to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserting, inter alia, that he
was denied his statutory and constitutional rights by not be-
ing granted a full adversarial hearing during the permit pro-
ceedings. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision
and found that:
a) the Corps had jurisdiction to require a permit for But-
trey's development proposal;
b) the procedure used by the Corps in denying the permit
was not unconstitutional; and
c) the Corps acted properly in denying the permit.
The circuit court further held that Buttrey had neither a
constitutional right' to an adversarial hearing nor a statutory
right to such a hearing under section 404.
Recently, Buttrey's attempt to appeal the circuit court
decision to the Supreme Court was thwarted when the Court
denied his petition for certiorari. e
7. Buttrey v. United States, No. 80-1617 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 1981).
8. This note will concentrate on the statutory interpretation of section 404 and
Buttrey's rights as established in the language of the CWA. Buttrey's constitutional
(due process) right to an adversarial hearing will not be addressed. However, the
reader will find discussion of this constitutional issue in Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Elridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28 (1976);
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975); and 4 Mezines,
Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law § 32.01 (1983).
9. Buttrey v. United States, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
[Vol. 2
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III. Background: Notice and Comment Rulemaking
Versus "On the Record" Adjudication"0
The language of CWA imposes on both the Corps and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the requirement
that "public hearings" be held with respect to the decision
whether to issue or deny a permit authorized by section 404 or
section 402.11 Neither CWA nor its legislative history, how-
ever, give precise definition or clarification as to the proce-
dures which are required in these public hearings. To obtain
clarification one must look to other sources of congressional
intent as to the procedures which are to apply in these types
of administrative actions. One such source is the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.12
The general provisions of APA establish the procedure to
be followed in any administrative hearing unless the hearing
has been expressly exempted by Congress in the hearing's au-
thorizing statute' s or the hearing is exempted by the provi-
sions of APA itself.14
APA establishes two distinct standards for administrative
10. The purpose of this section is merely to give the reader a general understand-
ing of the applicable provisions and principles of APA. For a more detailed study see
1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ch. 6 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982) (relating
to rulemaking) and 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ch. 12 (relating to the
requirement of trial-type hearings).
11. See supra note 5.
12. See supra note 3.
13. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1982) states:
This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that there is involved - (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the
United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or
to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
And 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) states:
This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved -
(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in
a court; (2) the selection or tenure of an employee except an administrative
law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title; (3) proceedings in which
decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections; (4) the conduct of mili-
tary or foreign affairs functions; (5) cases in which the agency is acting as an
agent for the court; or (6) the certification of worker representatives.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/5
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public hearings. One is the notice and comment process of
section 55315 and the other is the adjudicatory process of sec-
tion 554.18 Under section 553, an agency is only required to
give notice of the proposed agency action in the Federal Reg-
ister (such notice must include the time and place for a hear-
ing to consider the proposed action)17 and give interested per-
sons an opportunity to participate in the hearing on the
proposed action by allowing them to submit written data or
arguments in favor of or against the proposed action. 8 The
essence of the notice and comment hearing is that it is basi-
cally a "speech-making hearing"19 designed to allow public
discussion and input of public opinion on the issue being con-
sidered by the agency. The purpose of the notice and com-
ment hearing is to place before the agency all relevant infor-
mation necessary for reasoned decisionmaking.
Section 554, on the other hand, involves more formalized
proceedings which impose the stricter procedural require-
ments of sections 556 and 557.20 Those procedural hearing re-
quirements include provisions for the parties to have the right
to cross examine witnesses, 1 to present oral testimony,22 to
have a written record of all testimony and evidence pre-
pared,23 and to submit proposed findings or conclusions based
on the evidence.24 Such adversarial procedures constitute
what is commonly referred to as "on the record"2 5 adjudica-
15. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
16. 5 U.SC. § 554 (1982).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (1982).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
19. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 12:7 at 434 (2d ed. 1979).
20. See Comment, The Requirement Of Formal Adjudication Under The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: When Is Section 554(a) Triggered So As To Require
Application Of Sections 554, 556, And 557?., 11 Envtl. L. 97 (1980).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982).
22. Id.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1982).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(1) (1982).
25. Section 554(a) states: "This section applies . .. in every case of adjudication
S.. to be determined on the record .... " 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
Sometimes section 553 proceedings are also performed "on the record." See 5
U.S.C. § 553(c) ("When rules are required by statute to be made on the record . . .
sections 556 and 557 . . . apply. ... )
[Vol. 2
5
BUTTREY v. UNITED STATES
tions. The procedures of sections 556 and 557 set up what is
the functional agency equivalent of a judicial trial.
The stricter requirements of sections 554, 556 and 557,
however, do not apply to any hearing unless they are clearly
"required by statute."2 Therefore it is necessary to find ex-
press congressional mandate or obvious congressional intent
that the procedural requirements of sections 554, 556 and 557
apply to any particular hearing before those procedures can
be judicially imposed on an agency.
A court reviewing any agency action is restricted to im-
posing either the notice and comment requirements of section
553 or the adjudicatory requirements of section 554. A court
may not judicially impose any greater requirements than
those set out in APA 27
Buttrey's argument in this case was quite simple. He
claimed that the language of section 404 of CWA, which states
that the Corps may only issue permits after "opportunity for
public hearings,' 28 is a clear statutory mandate from Congress
requiring the Corps to hold full trial-type proceedings on the
record when issuing dredge and fill permits.2 9 Buttrey's asser-
26. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). See also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry.
Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
27. Such additional requirements establish what is referred to as a "hybrid" pro-
ceeding. Such a proceeding is considered hybrid because it incorporates some of the
aspects of both a section 553 hearing and a section 554 hearing. Some agencies imple-
ment hybrid proceedings voluntarily. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 12.80-12.99 (1984) (Food
and Drug Administration). However, the Supreme Court has ruled in Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Vermont Yan-
kee), 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978), and later reaffirmed in Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983), that hybrid proce-
dures could not be judicially imposed on an agency in the absence of explicit statu-
tory language to that effect.
For an example of a statutory requirement of hybrid proceedings see 15 U.S.C. §
57a (1982) relating to proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission. See also S.
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 401 (1975) (general analysis of hybrid
proceedings and a discussion of the development of hybrid proceedings prior to Ver-
mont Yankee).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
29. Buttrey also asserted that the Corps hearing violated his right to due process,
that the administrative record was incomplete, that the procedures used by the Corps
to determine their jurisdiction were improper, and that the Corps's decision to deny
the permit was arbitrary and capricious. 690 F.2d at 1174.
19851
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tion is based on previous circuit court holdings3" which have
construed the term "public hearings" under a similar section
of CWA, section 402, to require full trial-type proceedings on
the record.
IV. The Court's Interpretation of Section 404
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Buttrey's argument and
found that section 402 and section 404 each impose different
procedural requirements. The court held that, although sec-
tion 402 requires trial-type proceedings, section 404 requires
no more than the minimal notice and comment procedures of
section 553 of APA.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that CWA
gives no definition of the term "public hearing," and, there-
fore, found it necessary to ascertain the "substantive nature of
the hearing Congress intended to provide."31 The court fur-
ther found it necessary to look to the legislative history of sec-
tion 404 in order to determine congressional intent. After ex-
amining the legislative history of section 404, the court stated
that: "This is one of those rare instances when a statute's his-
tory leaves no room for doubt. '32 The court decided that the
legislative history evinced a clear intention by Congress to re-
quire the Corps to continue using the same, simplified, notice
and comment hearings that the Corps had been using to issue
dredge and fill permits since before the enactment of CWA.33
The court held that the legislative history provided conclusive
evidence that procedures characteristic of "on the record" ad-
judications were not to be used.
Perhaps a brief look at that legislative history, which so
influenced the Fifth Circuit in its decision, is in order here.
Prior to the enactment of CWA, Congress had vested in the
Corps the authority to issue permits for dredge and fill activi-
ties in the navigable waters of the United States. That author-
30. See supra note 6.
31. 690 F.2d at 1174, quoting Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d
at 876.
32. 690 F.2d at 1175.
33. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)-(g) (1969).
[Vol. 2
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ity was established in section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA)."' The procedures used by
the Corps for authorizing dredge and fill activities under RHA
are presently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (the
Code).35 The procedures set out in section 327 of the Code call
for a simplified hearing open to the public and all interested
parties. The hearing requirements of section 327 of the Code
impose stricter procedural requirements than those required
by section 553 of APA, 6 yet they are not as strict as the pro-
cedures under sections 554, 556 and 557 .7 Indeed, the proce-
dures used by the Corps could properly be labeled as hybrid.38
Congress was well aware of the procedures used by the Corps
when it drafted the statute which eventually became the pre-
sent CWA.3 1
The initial draft of CWA had two versions. The first, the
Senate bill,' vested EPA with the authority under section 402
34. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, § 10, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151
(1899), codified in 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). The Act states, in pertinent part: "it shall
not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course,
location, condition, or capacity of. . . any navigable water of the United States, un-
less the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of War prior to beginning the same."
35. 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (1984), which derives its authority from 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1982) (the present codification of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act), states
that a permit under section 404 of CWA is required if an activity involves the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States.
33 C.F.R. pt. 327 (1984) establishes the procedures to be followed in any public
hearing held to determine whether to issue a section 404 permit.
36. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 327.8(b), which allows for oral statements and the pres-
entation of testimony through witnesses, with 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), which gives the
agency discretion to deny a party the opportunity to make oral statements and, in
addition, has no provision for the use of witnesses. Also, compare 33 C.F.R. §
327.8(e), which requires a verbatim transcript of the proceedings to be compiled, with
5 U.S.C. § 553, which has no provision for the compilation of a transcript.
37. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), which requires that a party be allowed to cross
examine witnesses when a matter of fact is in issue, with 33 C.F.R. § 327.8(d), which
expressly forbids the use of cross examination.
38. See supra note 27.
39. In the 1977 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), Congress established the common designation of FWPCA to be the "Clean
Water Act of 1977." Act of Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
40. See S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 3668.
1985]
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to issue permits for all discharges of any material, including
dredged and fill material, into the waters of the United
States.4 1 The second version, which contained an amendment
added by the House, established section 404 as a separate sec-
tion which vested the Secretary of the Army with the power to
grant permits for the discharge of dredged and fill material.
4 2
Congress consciously adopted the House's amended version
when it enacted CWA. The Fifth Circuit interpreted this ac-
tion by Congress to mean that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate into section 404 the existing simplified procedures previ-
ously used by the Corps for issuing dredge and fill permits.
A report delivered by Senator Muskie on behalf of the
Conference Committee discussed significant portions of
CWA.43 That report briefly refers to the provisions for the
control of discharge of dredge and fill material and acknowl-
edges that the Conference Committee was "uniquely aware of
the process by which the dredge and fill permits [were then]
handled and did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy
in light of the fact that a system to issue permits already ex-
isted. '4 4 Based on this evidence extracted from the legislative
history, the court declined to impose upon the Corps the strict
requirements of a full adversarial hearing conducted on the
record.
The court buttressed its findings by analyzing subsequent
amendments to CWA made in 1977."5 The court found that
the 1977 amendments left the section 404 procedures for issu-
ing permits virtually untouched and, further, found that the
changes which did occur were aimed at "eliminating delay and
red tape in processing applications. '46 Thus, the court rea-
soned that Congress had acquiesced in the simplified permit-
issuing procedures which were being used and, further,
amended the procedures in an effort to increase the simplicity
41. Id. at 3735-39.
42. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3818-19.
43. 118 Cong. Rec. 33,699 (1972).
44. Id.
45. 690 F.2d at 1175.
46. Id.
[Vol. 2
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of section 404 implementation.47
Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded its statutory interpre-
tation of section 404 by opining that the term "public hear-
ing" should be given its plain and obvious meaning. That is,
"a speech-making hearing rather than a [trial-type] hearing
... on the record."4  The court cautioned that to hold other-
wise would result in reading more into the statute than was
intended by its draftsmen.
V. Analysis of the Court's Holding
The court's rationale has several strong points as well as
several weaknesses. The legislative history of section 404 cer-
tainly offers persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend
to burden the Corps with full-blown, adversarial hearings on
the record. However, that evidence is discounted by the fact
that Congress did not include in CWA any explicit statutory
language to support such an intention. Furthermore, the legis-
lative history does not indicate a clear intention to impose in-
formal notice and comment proceedings, but refers only to re-
47. Those amendments included:
(a) the imposition of a fifteen day deadline (beginning upon receipt of a complete
application) for the Secretary of the Army to issue public notice (and thus begin the
proceedings), (section 404(a));
(b) authorization for the Secretary of the Army to issue general regional, state or
nationwide dredge and fill permits for activities and categories of activities which
cause only minimal adverse environmental effects, (section 404(e));
(c) the exemption from the permit process of certain wetlands activities which do
not significantly affect the environment, (section 404(f));
(d) authorization for the secretary of the Army to delegate his permit-issuing
power to the states once they have adopted a suitable implementation plan, (section
404(g)).
The amendments were introduced for the stated purpose of reducing "adminis-
trative paperwork and delay." S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (July 28,
1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4326, 4405. However, the pri-
mary concern of Congress appeared to be with providing the Corps with a simple and
streamlined procedure for regulating dredge and fill operations which involved only
minor environmental impact. Except for the fifteen day deadline, the amendments do
not seem to be aimed at simplifying those ordinary dredge and fill permit procedures
which involve a single applicant whose proposed activity will cause a significant envi-
ronmental impact.
48. 690 F.2d at 1176, quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 12:7, at
434 (2d ed. 1979).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/5
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quiring non-burdensome proceedings. Therefore, the crucial
question which arises is whether imposing the adversarial pro-
cedures of APA sections 554, 556 and 557 on the Corps is to
be considered "burdensome" and, thus, not what Congress
intended. 9
The greatest deficiency in the court's holding is its obvi-
ous inconsistency with the previous interpretation of the term
"public hearings" under section 402 of CWA as made by other
circuit courts.50 Those courts have consistently held that a
"public hearing" under section 402 of CWA means a full ad-
versarial hearing conducted on the record in accordance with
the procedures of sections 556 and 557 of APA.
The Fifth Circuit attempts to explain away this discrep-
ancy in interpretation by, first, espousing the principle that it
is possible "for a term to have different meanings, even in the
same statute,"' 1 a principle which was enunciated in Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle (Environmental Defense
Fund).2 Proceeding on this principle, the court reasons that
an examination of the legislative history of sections 404 and
402 makes it obvious that Congress intended the term "public
hearing" to have different meanings and, therefore, a review-
ing court must give deference to this congressional intention..
Although the principle set out in Environmental Defense
Fund does have some appeal, the courts should exercise great
caution in its implementation. Environmental Defense Fund
involved an interpretation of the term "public hearings"
under section 16(b) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
49. Although the Supreme Court stated in Vermont Yankee that a reviewing
court is limited to imposing either the procedures set by section 553 of APA or the
procedures set by section 554, 556 and 557, this does not mean that section 553 pro-
ceedings are "non-burdensome" and section 554 proceedings are "burdensome." For
example, if it is possible for the Corps to fully comply with sections 554, 556 and 557
in its permit proceedings simply by increasing their manpower, then one might ques-
tion whether the imposition of those sections would be such a "burden" that compli-
ance, therefore, must be rejected.
50. See supra note 6.
51. 690 F.2d at 1175, quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 631
F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
52. 631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
[Vol. 2
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Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) .5  The D.C. Circuit found that
"public hearing" could have several different meanings in its
various uses under FIFRA. The rationale of the D.C. Circuit,
however, is not So clearly applicable to the Buttrey case and
CWA. The term "public hearing," as it was used in the vari-
ous sections of FIFRA, referred to procedurally dissimilar and
relatively unrelated aspects of the statute.5 On the other
hand, "public hearing" as used in sections 402 and 404 of
CWA, refers to virtually identical substantive aspects of the
statute, i.e., sections which both establish hearings to deter-
mine whether or not to issue a permit for discharge. The ques-
tion not entirely answered by Environmental Defense Fund is
whether it is possible for a term, which is used in substan-
tively identical aspects of a statute, to have drastically differ-
ent meanings although the statute contains no express lan-
guage which indicates that a difference in meanings should
exist. The Buttrey court posits that this question should be
answered in the affirmative. However, any answer to this
question is difficult to justify. Whether one answers in the
negative or the affirmative depends on whether one attributes
53. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982); see 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b).
54. The sections of FIFRA referred to in Environmental Defense Fund were sec-
tion 136n(b), section 136d(b) & (d), and section 1361(a)(3):
Section 136n(b) allows for review by a United States court of appeals of "any
order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing .... " 7 U.S.C. §
136n(b) (1982).
Section 136d(d) sets the procedures to be followed during a hearing requested
pursuant to section 136d(b). Section 136d(b) authorizes the Administrator to issue
notice of and conduct a "hearing to determine whether or not [a pesticide) registra-
tion should be canceled or its classification changed." 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1982).
Finally, section 1361(a)(3) prohibits the agency from levying a civil penalty
against any person who violates the act "unless the person charged shall have been
given notice and opportunity for hearing ...." 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(3) (1982).
Thus, section 136n(b) merely uses the term "public hearing" to determine a ju-
risdictional standard for judicial review. See also 631 F.2d at 927-28 n.25. Sections
136d(b) & (d), on the other hand, refer to a hearing used to modify a regulation of
general application (i.e., classification of a pesticide), and section 1361(a)(3) sets up a
hearing, which is prosecutorial in nature, to determine the assessment of civil penal-
ties against a single individual.
The three uses of the term "public hearing" here are obviously made in strikingly
dissimilar contexts. It is no wonder the court had no reservations about finding differ-
ent meanings.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/5
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greater weight to the facial language of the statute or whether
one finds the legislative history of the statute controlling. Per-
haps this is why the Fifth Circuit in Buttrey concentrated so
heavily on the legislative history of section 404 rather than
becoming involved in a facial analysis of the statute's
language.
A review of federal case law reveals that courts have gen-
erally accepted the practice of giving different meanings to
identical terms used in the same statute.5 5 Perhaps the exis-
tence of such a commonly used practice explains the Fifth
Circuit's summary conclusion that the term "public hearing"
had different meanings under CWA.
A. The Decisions Interpreting Section 402
As stated above, the greatest apparent weakness in the
Fifth Circuit's holding is that the interpretation of the mean-
ing of "public hearings" under section 404 is inconsistent with
previous interpretations of the same term used under section
402 of the same Act. Those prior decisions have ruled that
"public hearings" under section 402 require full adversarial
proceedings conducted on the record. The difference in inter-
pretations sets up visible inconsistencies which may indicate
erroneous reasoning by one or a number of the circuit courts.
The present interpretation of section 402 of CWA was
first developed in United States Steel Corp. v. Train (U.S.
Steel).56 In that case, the Seventh Circuit addressed a chal-
lenge by the petitioner to the procedures used by EPA in issu-
ing a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES)57 permit. The court concluded that the provisions
of APA applied to the NPDES permit-issuing proceedings58
and that CWA mandated the use of trial-type proceedings
55. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(interpreting the word "order" under the
Bank Holding Company Act); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363
U.S. 536 (1960)(interpreting "price discrimination" under the Robinson-Patman Act).
56. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
57. A NPDES permit, when issued by EPA, is the same permit as that issued
under section 402.
58. Id. at 833.
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during any NPDES permit hearing.59 The court based its
holding on two grounds:
Section 509(b)(1)" of CWA, which provides for judicial
review, enumerates various sections of the act which involve
an "action" 61 by the Administrator of EPA. The section then
provides for review of these actions by a circuit court of ap-
peals. Of the sections enumerated by section 509(b)(1), only
one, section 307,62 expressly requires that the "action" to be
reviewed must be taken only after a hearing is held "on the
record."6 3 The court considered it improbable that, of all of
the sections enumerated in section 509(b)(1), Congress would
intend that only review of actions under section 307 would be
conducted with a written record and that actions taken under
the remaining sections would be reviewed without such a rec-
ord.64 Furthermore, the court noted that section 509(c), e5
which provides for the taking of additional evidence when
necessary, is applicable to "any judicial proceeding brought
under [section 509(b)] in which review is sought of a determi-
nation under this chapter required to be made on the record
after notice and opportunity for hearing .... ,"66 The Seventh
59. Id.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982). Section 1369(b)(1) provides, in part: "Review
of the Administrator's action... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such
person resides . . . upon application by such person."
61. Sections which involve reviewable actions under 509(b)(1) are: 33 U.S.C. §
1316 (relating to promulgation of performance standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(C)
(although this section does not exist, Congress was probably referring to 33 U.S.C. §
1316(c) relating to approval of state performance standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (relat-
ing to promulgation of effluent standards for, prohibition of, or pretreatment stan-
dards for toxics); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (relating to approval of state NPDES pro-
grams); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1315 (relating to approval and promulgation of
effluent limitations); and 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (relating to permits for pollutant
discharge).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) provides: "The Administrator, in his discretion, may
publish in the Federal Register a proposed effluent standard . . . . In addition, if
within thirty days of publication of any such proposed effluent standard (or prohibi-
tion) any interested person so requests, the Administrator shall hold a public hearing
in connection therewith."
64. 556 F.2d at 833.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (1982).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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Circuit construed this language to imply that all of the sec-
tions enumerated under section 509(b)(1) required a hearing
on the record at the administrative level. 7
Secondly, the Seventh Circuit saw the NPDES permit
proceeding as, essentially, an adjudicatory-type licensing pro-
ceeding which was subject to the procedures set by sections
556 and 557 of APA.6 Although in reaching this conclusion
the court incorrectly construed section 558(c) of APA as re-
quiring the application of sections 556 and 557 in all licensing
proceedings, it is clear that the court viewed the NPDES per-
mit proceeding as an adjudication which required strict proce-
dural protections. 9
67. Since section 307 is the only enumerated section of section 509(b) which ex-
pressly requires "on the record" hearings, the language of section 509(c), if construed
to apply only to section 307, "would have been an unusual way of singling out § 307
from all the sections listed in § 509(b)." 556 F.2d at 833 (footnote omitted).
68. 556 F.2d at 833.
69. The Seventh Circuit, in City of West Chicago v. United States Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (West Chicago), 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983), expressly reversed
the portion of U.S. Steel which relied upon section 558(c) as an independent trigger
of sections 556 and 557. In West Chicago, the Seventh Circuit adopted the view of
the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits that section 558(c) does not independently pro-
vide for formal adjudicatory hearings in licensing proceedings and that section 554(a)
is the sole trigger for determining when sections 556 and 557 will apply. 701 F.2d at
644. The Seventh Circuit was correct in its reversal. Section 558(c) provides, in part:
When application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with due
regard for the rights and privileges of all the interested parties or adversely
affected persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and complete pro-
ceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of
this title or other proceedings required by law and shall make its decision.
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982). This first sentence, upon which the court in U.S. Steel
based its holding, is obviously ambiguous. In fact, some circuit courts made the same
mistake as the U.S. Steel court and interpreted this section as independently requir-
ing the application of sections 556 and 557 to all licensing proceedings. See New York
Pathological & X-ray Laboratories, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 523
F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of
America v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
However, a review of the legislative history of APA reveals that section 558(c) was
intended merely as a section of general limitation. See H. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Congressional Service 1195, 1205 ("[The
Act] states the . . . general limitations on administrative powers (sec. [558])."); Id. at
1206 ("Section [558] limits sanctions .... ").
Section 558(c) appeared in the original version of APA as section 9(b) under the
heading of "Sanctions and Powers." See Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 242
(June 11, 1946). The language, similar to the present statute, read as follows:
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Later in 1977, in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA (Marathon
Oil),"° the Ninth Circuit addressed the same question raised
in U.S. Steel, namely, whether the adjudicatory proceedings
under section 402 of the CWA must comply with the proce-
dural requirements of sections 556 and 557 of APA. The
Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative, but did not wholly
adopt the rationale in U.S. Steel.71 The Ninth Circuit, like the
Seventh Circuit, relied on the interpretation of the provision
for judicial review (section 509) in reaching its holding. But,
the court went on to support its holding on a finding that a
hearing under section 402 is clearly an adjudication because it
is concerned with the determination of past and present rights
and liabilities where "the issues of fact are often sharply con-
troverted. 7 2 The court also felt that an adversarial proceed-
ing would be the best suited for "guaranteeing both reasoned
decisionmaking and meaningful judicial review" when the
proceeding involves adjudication of disputed facts in particu-
lar cases and does not involve the promulgation of policy
Licenses. - In any case in which application is made for a license required
by law the agency, with due regard to the rights or privileges of all the inter-
ested parties or adversely affected persons and with reasonable dispatch,
shall set and complete any proceedings required to be conducted pursuant to
sections [556 and 557] of this Act or other proceedings required by law and
shall make its decision.
It is somewhat clearer that, under this section of "Sanctions and Powers," the
first sentence of section 9(b) was merely intended as a grant of power which author-
ized the agency, as opposed to some other body (like a court), to set and complete
licensing proceedings when such proceedings were required by law. Further, the sec-
tion also designated the agency as the body authorized to render the decision on the
license application.
The most that can be said about section 558(c), to the extent that it relates to
trial-type proceedings, is that "Congress assumed that most licenses would be gov-
erned by §§ 556 and 557." Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d at 878
n.11; see also Comment, The Requirement Of Formal Adjudication Under The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: When Is Section 554(a) Triggered So As To Require
Application Of Sections 554, 556, And 557?, 11 Envtl. L. at 120-21.
70. 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. "We agree with the Seventh Circuit that APA adjudicatory hearing require-
ments apply. However, we reach this result by a slightly different route." 564 F.2d at
1260 (footnote omitted).
72. 564 F.2d at 1262, quoting The Att'y General's Manual on APA, at 14-15
(1947).
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based rules or standards for general application." The court
concluded that section 402 proceedings were the type of adju-
dicatory proceedings which Congress sought to address in sec-
tions 554, 556, and 557 of APA and, therefore, required their
application.
Finally, in 1978, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
Costle ( Seacoast),7 4 the First Circuit reached the same con-
clusion as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits as to the proce-
dures required at a section 402 hearing. The First Circuit ra-
tionale more closely resembled that of the Marathon Oil
decision than the U.S. Steel decision because the First Circuit
examined the substantive nature of the proceeding at hand
and found it to be essentially adjudicatory.7 The court found
the section 402 adjudication to be one which seriously impacts
an applicant's private rights and, therefore, the strict proce-
dural requirements of sections 556 and 557 were necessary to
protect those rights. The holding in Seacoast is significant be-
cause, unlike the prior holdings, the court based its decision
principally on the adjudicative nature of the decision at issue
and explained the necessity of making specific factual findings
pursuant to sections 556 and 557 in order to protect those
rights of the applicant.
B. Buttrey's Inconsistency with the Prior Holdings
In light of these three cases one might ask whether the
Buttrey decision can be reconciled against these prior hold-
ings which view permit proceedings under CWA as essentially
adjudicatory. Reconciliation appears difficult when one exam-
ines the similarity in substance of sections 402 and 404.16
Under the rationale of U.S. Steel, the Buttrey decision
does not withstand scrutiny. The U.S. Steel court apparently
viewed the section 402 permit hearing as a licensing proceed-
ing and intimated that certain procedural protections ought to
73. 564 F.2d at 1262.
74. 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
75. "This is exactly the kind of quasi-judicial proceeding for which the adjudica-
tory procedures of APA were intended." 572 F. 2d at 876.
76. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)-(2) with 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(b).
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apply in such proceedings." Indeed, this interpretation is
clearly in accord with section 551(8) of APA7 8 which defines a
license as including "the whole or a part of an agency per-
mit," 7 9 and section 551(9)80 which defines licensing as an
"agency process respecting the grant [or] denial . . . of a li-
cense."81 Therefore, by definition, a licensing proceeding in-
cludes a permit proceeding.
Since section 402 proceedings are considered licensing
proceedings and the language calling for a hearing under sec-
tion 402 of CWA is virtually identical to that calling for a
hearing under section 404, one would logically assume that the
APA should apply equally to both. The Buttrey court, how-
ever, did not follow this logic.
Attention should be accorded an observation made by the
Ninth Circuit when it rendered its decision in Marathon Oil
since it reflects the essence of the First, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits' perception of nature of a section 402 proceeding. In
Marathon Oil the court stated that "[t]he setting of effluent
limitations under § 402 of the [CWA] . . . falls squarely
within the mainstream of traditional adjudications." 2 The
court obviously meant that section 402 permit proceedings
were to be accorded all of the procedural protections normally
involved in adjudicatory hearings because the permit proceed-
ing there was inherently adjudicatory in nature. In essence,
the Ninth Circuit recognized that "certain administrative de-
cisions closely resemble judicial determinations and . . . re-
quire similar procedural protections."83 These types of pro-
77. Again, although the court incorrectly construed section 558(c) of APA it is
obvious that the court was searching for some justification for the imposition of the
procedural protections of sections 556 and 557, which it considered were necessary.
Indeed, it appears that the court bent over backwards to apply sections 556 and 557
and, therefore, must have thought the application of those sections to be of great
importance.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (1982).
79. Id.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551(9) (1982).
81. Id.; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985, 992 n.12
(D.D.C. 1983).
82. 564 F.2d at 1263.
83. 564 F.2d at 1261.
1985]
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/5
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ceedings are termed "quasi-judicial" " and are exactly the
"category of proceedings [which] Congress sought to address"
in sections 554, 556 and 557 of APA.16
Proceedings to grant, revoke, or modify certain types of
licenses have long been recognized as proceedings which are
quasi-judicial in character and, thus, entitled to a full trial-
type hearing.86 Since a proceeding to license or permit the dis-
charge of pollutants into the waters of the United States -
such discharge being necessary for an applicant to carry on
the operation of a business - is considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding, then, is not a proceeding to permit a discharge of
dredge or fill material into the same waters - such discharge
likewise being necessary for an applicant to carry on the oper-
ation of a business - also a quasi-judicial proceeding? Con-
trary to the obvious answer, Buttrey answers "no."
Under both the Marathon Oil and the Seacoast decisions,
the Buttrey rationale also appears flawed. The section 404
permit proceedings will inevitably involve the adjudication of
the same type of factual issues. and result in the same in-
fringement upon private rights as would result in a section
402 permit hearing. As stated above, an individual applying
for either a section 402 or a section 404 permit usually desires
a permit to discharge material into the water in order that he
might conduct some profitable, or otherwise personally benefi-
cial, venture. The discharge of the material will often be es-
sential to the successful operation or completion of that ven-
ture. Denial of a permit under either section 402 or section
404 will result in the particular applicant being denied a right
to use his property as he desires. In both instances the appli-
cant's right to use his property will be pitted against the de-
84. Id. at 1261.
85. Id. at 1264.
86. "The basic principle governing opportunity to be heard - that a trial-type of
hearing is required on issues of adjudicative fact when important interests are at
stake, in absence of sufficient reason for refusing or modifying a trial-type of hearing
- is fully applicable to denying, refusing to renew, suspending, or revoking licenses
of various kinds." K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:18, at 493 (1958 ed.);
See also Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. Federal
Com. Comm'n, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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gree of adverse environmental effect resulting from his activ-
ity.87 In either case, determination of the degree of this
87. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1984) sets out the policy considerations which must be
addressed at every hearing for determination of whether to issue a dredge and fill
permit under section 404 of CWA. Among the considerations which the Corps must
address before issuing a dredge and fill permit are:
1) The "probable impact including cumulative impacts of the proposed activity
and its intended use on the public interest." 33 C.F.R § 320.4(a)(1). (All relevant
factors which bear upon the impact an activity may have on the public interest must
be considered. The detrimental factors must be weighed against the beneficial factors.
Factors for consideration include: conservation, economics, aesthetics, general envi-
ronmental concerns, wetlands, cultural values, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
flood plain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water
supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber produc-
tion, mineral needs and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people. 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(a)(1).)
2) "The relative extent of the public and private need for the proposed . . .
work[.]" 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(i).
3) "Where there are unresolved conflicts as to resource use, the practicability of
using reasonable alternative locations and methods to accomplish the objective of the
proposed . . . work].]" 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(ii).
4) "The extent and permanence of the beneficial and/or detrimental effects
which the . . . work may have on the public and private uses to which the area is
suited." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(iii).
Items numbered one through four are commonly referred to as the Corps' public
interest review. It was an adverse determination using this method of review which
prompted the Corps to deny Buttrey's permit. 690 F.2d at 1173.
In addition, the Corps must algo address the following considerations where
applicable:
1) The damage to vital wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b).
2) Thc direct and indirect loss of and damage to fish and wildlife. 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(c).
3) Compliance or non-compliance with water quality standards. 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(d).
4) The effect on values such as those associated with historic, cultural, scenic,
and recreational areas. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(e).
5) The effect on the coast line or base line of the territorial United States. 33
C.F.R. § 320.4(f).
6) The interference with adjacent property owners or water resource projects. 33
C.F.R. § 320.4(g).
7) The effect on any coastal zone management program. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(h).
8) The impact on any marine sanctuary. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(i).
9) The safety of impoundment structures. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(k).
See also 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.1-323.6 (1984) for additional restrictions on the grant-
ing of permits for discharge of dredge and fill material.
All of the above listed considerations must be resolved in favor of a proposed
project before a dredge and fill permit may be authorized. Obviously the resolution of
many of the considerations will be based on facts which will be open to various per-
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adverse environmental impact will often involve highly con-
troverted facts. Determinations of this type are best served by
full trial-type proceedings. Moreover, the Seacoast and Mara-
thon Oil courts' perception - that hearings to issue permits
are inherently adjudications of private rights which require
formal procedural protections - is diametrically opposed to
the Buttrey court's perception.
C. Buttrey's Consistency with the Prior Holdings
In spite of the apparent inconsistency between the inter-
pretation of section 404 in Buttrey and the interpretation of
section 402 by other circuits, there is evidence which, argua-
bly, justifies the difference in the holdings.
The basic premise of the Fifth Circuit in Buttrey is that
Congress intended that the term "public hearing" was to have
different meanings. The court supports this argument almost
totally by an examination of the legislative history of CWA.
However, there are certain other aspects of CWA which sup-
port the court's finding:
1) The independence of section 404 from the remainder
of CWA. As originally proposed by the Senate, section 402 of
CWA was to control the issuance of all permits for the dis-
charge of any material into the waters of the United States.88
The House, however, removed from section 402 the control
over the issuance of permits for the discharge of dredged and
fill material and placed it under the control of section 404.
Except for the requirement that the Secretary of the
ceptions. Indeed, many of the designated considerations are extremely amorphous.
EPA, too, must consider the environmental effects of issuing a permit. However,
EPA is not required to go through a detailed environmental analysis every time it
issues a permit. Instead, CWA provides for the establishment of standards and limi-
tations for effluent discharges (33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 & 1312) and standards for perform-
ance of specific categories of dischargers (33 U.S.C. § 1316), all of which, in turn, are
based on water quality criteria established under 33 U.S.C. § 1314. The bulk of the
environmental assessment is conducted by EPA during the promulgation of these va-
rious standards. Therefore, the primary duty of EPA during a permit-issuing pro-
ceeding is to determine whether issuance of a permit will comply with the established
standards and determine what conditions must be imposed on an applicant in order
to insure compliance.
88. See 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3816.
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Army confer with the Administrator of EPA when adopting
guidelines for proposed disposal sites,89 section 404 has the ca-
pability to operate quite independently from the remainder of
CWA. For example, although enforcement of section 404 per-
mit violations may be accomplished by EPA under section
309,90 the Secretary of the Army is given totally separate and
distinct authority to enforce section 404 permits under section
404(s).91 In addition, compliance with the provisions of a sec-
tion 404 permit is automatically deemed to constitute compli-
ance with the remainder of CWA, regardless of whether, in
fact, such compliance exists.92
It appears that the procedures and interpretations ac-
corded to the CWA may not have the same applicability to
section 404 on the basis that section 404 is, in essence, a
wholly separate and distinct scheme of regulation. Therefore,
public hearings may be properly construed to have separate
meanings under sections 402 and 404 since, arguably, they are
not part of the "same" statute.
2) Absence of section 404 from the provisions for judicial
review. In U.S. Steel and Marathon Oil, both courts ex-
amined section 509(b)(1) of CWA (which provides for review
of agency action in the circuit courts of appeal) to find sup-
port for the proposition that section 402 proceedings were in-
tended to be conducted on the record. The proposition was
derived from an inference that since one enumerated section
(section 307) under 509(b)(1) expressly provided for trial-type
hearings at the agency level, then all the sections enumerated
under 509(b)(1) were meant to be handled in the same way.
Secondly, the proposition was derived from the principle that
courts of appeal are not equipped to take evidence and, there-
fore, it is assumed that a complete record will have previously
been compiled by the acting authority (in this case, the
agency). Moreover, since notice and comment proceedings do
not traditionally produce, nor do they guarantee the produc-
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)-(c) (1982).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s) (1982).
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
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tion of, a complete record of all relevant evidence, logic re-
quires that the proceedings under the enumerated sections of
section 509(b)(1) be conducted on the record. e3
Examination of section 509(b)(1) reveals, however, that
section 404 is not one of the enumerated sections which re-
quire review in a court of appeals. Indeed, CWA makes abso-
lutely no provision for judicial review of a permit granted or
denied under section 404.94 If Congress had intended that a
section 404 hearing be conducted on the record, presumably
Congress would have acted consistently and provided for judi-
cial review in the courts of appeal as was required for all other
hearings under CWA which are intended to be conducted on
the record.
3) Jurisdiction vested in different agencies. Jurisdiction
over the issuance of section 402 permits is vested in EPA.
Congress consciously vested authority for the issuance of sec-
tion 404 permits in the Corps after considering and rejecting
the possibility of vesting such authority in EPA. 5
The organizational make-up of the Corps is substantially
dissimilar to that of EPA. The Corps is a decentralized agency
composed of thirty-six district engineers and eleven division
engineers.96 The power to review applications for permits is
vested in the district engineers who review the application,
publicize a notice that an application has been received, and
receive information and comments regarding the application. 7
The district engineer may make a decision to grant or deny
the permit or he may forward the application and related
materials to the appropriate division engineer, or higher au-
thority such as the Chief Engineer or the Secretary himself,
who then decides to issue or deny the permit.98 Whether the
93. See Att'y General's Manual on APA, at 41 (1979) (A provision for judicial
review of an agency proceeding in a court of appeals implies that the agency proceed-
ing is to be conducted on the record).
94. Judicial review of section 404 permit grants or denials is therefore provided
by 5 U.S.C. § 702 which allows for review of agency action in any court of the United
States.
95. See supra notes 40-42.
96. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(2) (1984).
97. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2 (1984).
98. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(6) (1984).
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decision to issue or deny the permit is made by the division
engineer, the district engineer or higher authority, that deci-
sion, and the notice thereof to the applicant, is considered a
"final action" appealable in a federal court.99 There is no pro-
vision for any administrative appeal of the decision once it is
made. 100
EPA, on the other hand, is a much more complex agency.
EPA has a central headquarters in Washington, D.C. which
oversees ten regional offices throughout the United States.101
The headquarters is a complex organization within itself, com-
posed of nine staff offices, each delegated with authority to
handle certain aspects of the administrative process.102 The
staff offices include divisions for enforcement of environmen-
tal regulations as well as divisions to hear and adjudge contro-
versies. The agency also has internal procedures for appeal
and review of adjudicatory findings.
As stated earlier, Congress was aware of the simplified
procedure used by the Corps for issuing permits under the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. Congress was
also aware of the difference in organizational make-up be-
tween the Corps and EPA. Congress' choice to vest authority
to issue permits in an organization as small and as ill-
equipped as the Corps is to handle complex and lengthy ad-
versarial trials, is evidence that Congress did not intend such
adversarial trials to be required. To hold otherwise might re-
sult in giving CWA an unreasonable meaning. Such a practice
is not sound statutory construction. °0
The Seventh Circuit court in U.S. Steel acknowledged
the possibility that an interpretation which required a trial-
type hearing might have to be rejected if such an interpreta-
tion produced unreasonable results. The court pointed out
that a certain interpretation of a statute might be rejected if a
party could demonstrate that such an interpretation might
99. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(7) (1984).
100. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(2) (1984).
101. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1984).
102. See 40 C.F.R. subpart B (1984).
103. See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 45.12 (4th ed. 1984). But see
T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
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overburden an agency with an amount of litigation impossible
to handle."0 4 The court's holding in Buttrey preserves the sta-
tus quo and prevents the Corps from being overburdened with
complex adjudications to the point that the Corps' permit-is-
suing operation is stultified.
VI. Criticism and Conclusion
The holding in Buttrey espouses several principles, some
of which are supported by a questionable rationale. The pri-
mary rule of law established in Buttrey is that, under CWA,
applicants for a section 404 dredge and fill permit are not en-
titled to a trial-type hearing before the Army Corps of Engi-
neers. The holding states that neither CWA itself, nor the
principles of constitutional due process require such an adver-
sarial hearing.
Shortly after Buttrey had been decided, the rationale was
followed in two district court cases. In Shoreline Associates v.
Marsh (Shoreline Associates),'1 5 the District Court for the
District of Maryland relied on the Buttrey holding to sustain
the denial of a dredge and fill permit to Shoreline Associates,
a developer which wished to dredge and fill approximately 8.2
acres of Assawoman Bay in Ocean City, Maryland, in order to
build a townhouse community and marina.
Several months later, in National Wildlife Federation v.
Marsh (National Wildlife),' ° the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia used the Buttrey holding as a basis for dis-
missing National Wildlife's assertion that the Corps should
have held a trial-type hearing before issuing a permit which
allowed an energy company to dredge a part of the Elizabeth
River and a portion of the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia in or-
der to build an oil refinery. The significance of National
Wildlife is that it applies the Buttrey rationale to the side of
the coin not involved in Buttrey and Shoreline Associates,
i.e., that, in addition to an applicant requesting the issuance
of a permit, an interested party opposing the issuance of a
104. 556 F.2d at 834.
105. 555 F. Supp. 169 (D. Md. Jan. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1984).
106. 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. July 1983).
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permit is also not entitled to a full trial-type hearing.
The rule of law denying trial-type hearings to an appli-
cant or challenger to a section 404 permit, which Buttrey and
these cases establish, may be flawed in two respects. First, the
rule is based on, what the court considers, the intent of Con-
gress underlying section 404 of CWA. That is, the court be-
lieves that it was Congress' intent not to have trial-type hear-
ings apply to section 404 proceedings. Query, however,
whether one can reasonably say that this was truly Congress'
intent?
The fact that projects requiring dredge and fill permits
often draw widespread and enthusiastic response either in
support of or opposed to the proposed project (which response
is channeled into the permit proceeding),' 0 7 is an indication
that both the public and the applicant have substantial inter-
est in the matter in question. Indeed, section 404 permit pro-
ceedings almost always involve issues of public health or con-
venience as well as private economic loss or gain.'0 8 Often the
interests at stake involve huge sums of money (often the issu-
ance of a permit will determine the success or failure of a de-
velopment project) and matters of substantial public health.
It seems logical that these important interests might best be
served by being handled in a trial-type hearing which allows
extensive investigation into all crucial factors. Moreover, the
use of an impartial judge who concerns himself with general
societal good, rather than a specialized body narrowly con-
cerned with technical matters, might be the best arbiter of
such a controversy. Did Congress fail to forsee that matters of
such substantial public and private concern would be handled
by the section 404 proceedings? It seems unlikely.
The section 404 permit process has become a very power-
ful weapon for use by environmentalists and citizen groups in
107. For example, in National Wildlife over 1000 people attended the first pub-
lic hearing, and 535 letters were received during the comment period. 568 F. Supp. at
989.
108. The economic loss or gain may privately affect either the applicant himself
or other individual members of the public who are uniquely involved with the area
affected.
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their battles against unwanted developers. 09 The effect of the
Buttrey decision has been to put this incredible power in the
hands of the Corps of Engineers with only minimal judicial
control." 0 Congress must have been aware of the power it was
granting to the Corps, if nothing else, from the fact that it
granted jurisdiction over all the waters of the United
States."' It would seem reasonable that Congress would in-
tend some kind of check or judicial supervision over this ple-
nary power so as not to allow it to be wielded in an informal,
unguided and cursory manner.
Secondly, the Buttrey rule has overlooked the fact that a
section 404 permit proceeding, like a section 402 permit pro-
ceeding, is inherently an adjudication. The First, Ninth, and
Seventh Circuits all recognized the adjudicatory nature of sec-
tion 402 proceedings. Section 404 proceedings - which were
themselves originally intended to be section 402 proceedings,
but were removed to a different part of CWA - are of the
same nature. That is, both section 404 and 402 proceedings
involve determinations of factual issues which substantially
affect the rights of applicants and other individuals who are
affected by the subject site. Indeed, the result of the Buttrey
holding has been to further obscure the applicability of APA
to permit-issuing proceedings in general. As examined ear-
lier," 2 APA defines licensing to include the grant of an agency
permit, therefore, the section 404 permit proceeding is, in
fact, a licensing proceeding.'" Under APA the general rule
109. The classic and probably most popular example has been the initiation of a
lawsuit, based on CWA section 404 and NEPA, to stall the multi-million dollar
Westway project in New York City. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. The standard of judicial review of section 553 notice and comment proceed-
ings is the extremely deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). This standard, in effect, only requires the Corps to follow minimal proce-
dures when examining the matter in controversy and will rarely result in the court's
substitution of its own judgment for that of the Corps.
111. See S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. at 75, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4400 (Discussing the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction
under section 404); 118 Cong. Rec. 33,699 ("The Conferees fully intend that the term
navigable waters be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation .
112. See supra notes 78-81.
113. If the dredge and fill permit could somehow be shown not to fall within the
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has been that those licensing proceedings which rely inten-
sively on the determination of factual issues or the determina-
tion of the rights of specific individuals, usually require a
trial-type proceeding. Buttrey cuts against this reasonable
rule.
In effect, what the Fifth Circuit has done is ignore the
inherent character of the section 404 permit proceeding. The
holding not only impairs the right of the applicant to have a
fair determination of his rights, but it also impairs the rights
of other affected individuals to properly protect their rights
which may be infringed by the issuance of a permit.
What has been established is possibly flawed precedent
which excepts section 404 permit proceedings from the gener-
ally accepted rules of law concerning licenses. Moreover, the
court has made this exception without conclusive congres-
sional directive. It is quite possible, therefore, that the court
has exceeded the legitimate scope of its power and engaged in
improper judicial legislation.
Robert R. Sappe
category of a license, the court in Buttrey made no such showing.
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